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Rationale: Gambling and alcohol use are recreational behaviours that share substantial 
commonalities at a phenomenological, clinical, and neurobiological level. Past studies have 
shown that alcohol can have a disinhibiting effect on gambling behaviour, in terms of bet 
size and persistence.  
Objectives: To characterize how alcohol affects biases in judgment and decision-making 
that occur during gambling, with a focus on sequential decision-making including the 
gambler’s fallacy.  
Methods: Sequential biases were elicited via a roulette-based gambling task. Using a 
standard between-groups alcohol challenge procedure, male participants played the roulette 
task 20 minutes after receiving an alcoholic (0.8g/kg; n = 22) or placebo (n = 16) beverage. 
The task measured colour choice decisions (red/black) and bet size, in response to varying 
lengths of colour runs and winning/losing feedback streaks. 
Results: Across both groups, a number of established sequential biases were observed. On 
colour choice, there was an effect of run length in line with the gambler’s fallacy, which 
further varied by previous feedback (wins vs losses). Bet size increased with feedback 
streaks, especially for losing streaks. Compared to placebo, the alcohol group placed higher 
bets following losses compared to wins.  
Conclusions: Increased bet size after losses following alcohol consumption may reflect 
increased loss chasing that may amplify gambling harms. Our results do not fit a simple 
pattern of enhanced gambling distortions or reward sensitivity, but help contextualize the 
effects of alcohol on gambling to research on decision-making biases.  




Gambling and alcohol use are recreational activities with the capacity for excessive 
consumption, and are linked on multiple levels. On a clinical level, gambling disorder and 
alcohol use disorder have a strong clinical resemblance and significant co-morbidity 
(Lorains et al. 2011; Barnes et al. 2015). Neurobiological theories including the reward 
deficiency hypothesis posit a shared genetic disposition across the addictive disorders 
(Comings and Blum 2000). At subsyndromal levels of engagement, there is also a 
demonstrable association between gambling and alcohol use, with those who drink more 
being more likely to gamble and more likely to experience negative consequences from 
their gambling (Welte et al. 2001; Blankenship et al. 2007; French et al. 2008; Huggett et 
al. 2019). Although the co-occurrence and consequences of alcohol use and gambling are 
well documented in cross-sectional studies, less research has focused on the causal 
relationships between alcohol consumption and gambling behaviour as concurrent 
activities.  
As alcohol typically serves to impair executive functions and erode self-control, in 
particular via its actions on the prefrontal cortex (Lyvers 2000; Oscar-Berman and 
Marinkovi 2007), an intuitive hypothesis is that alcohol consumption will increase the 
intensity and/or duration of gambling behaviour. Some studies using simplified gambling 
tasks have supported this hypothesis. For example, alcohol consumption increased 
persistence in the face of mounting losses (Kyngdon and Dickerson 1999), and either 
increased or decreased one’s willingness to gamble depending on the dose of alcohol 
received (Sjoberg 1969). More recent studies have employed more realistic gambling 
procedures, including laboratory simulations of slot machines and blackjack (Phillips and 
Ogeil 2007, 2010; Cronce and Corbin 2010) as well as authentic ‘electronic gaming 
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machines’ (EGMs) (Ellery et al. 2005; Ellery and Stewart 2014; Barrett et al. 2015). In 
some studies, a moderately intoxicating dose of alcohol increased the speed and duration of 
play (Ellery et al. 2005; Phillips and Ogeil 2007), increased risky wagering (Ellery et al. 
2005; Cronce and Corbin 2010; Ellery and Stewart 2014), and resulted in a more rapid 
depletion of available funds (Ellery et al. 2005; Phillips and Ogeil 2007; Cronce and Corbin 
2010). However, there have also been conflicting reports (Breslin et al. 1999; Barrett et al. 
2015; Corbin and Cronce 2017; Sagoe et al. 2017; Wagner et al. 2018). For example, in a 
study by Barrett et al (2015), regular gamblers played an authentic EGM under four 
conditions, testing alcohol administration and nicotine stimulation in a 2 x 2 design. 
Alcohol increased a number of subjective effects including ‘want to gamble’ but did not 
affect EGM behaviour, while nicotine increased the average bet size. The gambling-
promoting effects of alcohol may be amplified in individuals with gambling problems 
(Ellery et al. 2005; Ellery and Stewart 2014), while in healthy participants, effects were 
moderated by impulsivity, a dispositional risk factor for gambling problems (Cronce and 
Corbin 2010). Lastly, a naturalistic study by Leino et al (2017) used behavioural tracking of 
EGM gamblers (via personal ID cards) to compare gambling between venues that did or did 
not serve alcohol. Within people who gambled in both types of venue within a 1 month 
period, gambling behaviour was more variable in alcohol serving venues, and financial 
losses were greater.  
Gambling behaviour is closely associated with a variety of cognitive distortions, 
primarily around the gamblers’ perception of their prospects of winning (Toneatto et al. 
1997). These erroneous beliefs are enhanced in healthy individuals with maladaptive 
gambling tendencies (Studer et al. 2015; Marmurek et al. 2015; Tobias-Webb et al. 2017) 
and are hypothesized to play a key role in the development of gambling disorder (Miller 
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and Currie 2008; Fortune and Goodie 2012; Yakovenko et al. 2016). One major class of 
gambling-related cognitive distortion relates to the processing of event sequences, which 
stem from a common failure to recognise the statistical independence of turns (Clark 2016). 
In the present study, we elicit these sequential biases using a roulette task in which 
participants make a series of binary (red / black) choices over a random outcome. The 
prototypical sequential bias is the ‘gambler’s fallacy’: the expectancy that after a run of one 
outcome (e.g. red, red, red), the alternative outcome (black) is more likely. The gambler’s 
fallacy is reported in naturalistic studies in gambling venues as well as in other real-world 
domains (Clotfelter and Cook 1993; Oskarsson et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2016).  
In its narrow version, the gambler’s fallacy refers to negative recency: the person 
feels that the other outcome is owed or due. In many settings, humans can show a distinct, 
and in some ways opposing, phenomenon termed the ‘hot hand effect’, in which they 
expect a streak of wins (or losses) to continue rather than reverse. This bias is typically seen 
in decisions attributable to human performance, such as in sports (Alter and Oppenheimer 
2006). The dominant account for both the gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect draws upon 
the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), whereby people fail to 
recognise the independence of turns because they expect a small sample of events to be 
representative of randomness in the overall population. In the case of the gambler’s fallacy, 
after a sequence of consecutive events, people believe the sequence should reverse in order 
to improve its representativeness to a random sequence. In the case of the hot hand, a streak 
of wins or losses violates the assumption of a random mechanism, leading to the 
expectancy that the streak will continue. Thus, the gambler’s fallacy primarily occurs when 
predicting outcome runs based on a random process (e.g. red or black outcomes on a 
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roulette wheel) whereas the hot hand applies to feedback streaks (i.e. wins or losses) in 
human performance (Croson and Sundali 2005; Oskarsson et al. 2009). 
Although the gambler’s fallacy is reliable under laboratory conditions (Ayton and 
Fischer 2004; Oskarsson et al. 2009; Studer et al. 2015), behavioural reactions to feedback 
streaks may be less consistent. A seminal experiment recording confidence ratings on 
roulette described an increase in confidence on winning streaks, and a mirrored decrease on 
losing streaks (Ayton and Fischer 2004). In our own work, we did not observe any 
systematic change in confidence on feedback streaks, but when the response was switched 
to a monetary bet, participants responded to losing streaks by increasing their bet size 
(Studer et al. 2015). This was interpreted as loss chasing, an attempt to recoup 
accumulating debts by increasing one’s bet, which is itself a clinical hallmark of disordered 
gambling (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. 2008; Temcheff et al. 2016). A study by Ball (2012) 
described subsets of participants who increased their bet size on losing streaks (either 
linearly or curvi-linearly), while others responded with increased wagering to winning 
streaks.   
For the present experiment, the first hypothesis was that alcohol consumption would 
exacerbate sequential biases using the roulette task from Studer et al (2015). The 
experiment by Kyngdon and Dickerson (1999) provides preliminary support for this 
hypothesis: participants in the alcohol condition placed higher bets after losses compared 
with wins, contrasting with no such difference in the placebo condition. In another study 
that investigated the effects of alcohol on a questionnaire measure of gambling distortions, 
alcohol prevented a natural decline in gambling distortions over a slot machine session in 
non-problematic gamblers, whereas in problem gamblers, alcohol did not seem to influence 
the questionnaire measure but did increase bet size on the slot machine (Ellery and Stewart 
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2014). The present study sought to investigate these sequential biases as a specific class of 
gambling-related cognitive distortion that be enhanced by alcohol. 
Other psychological theories for the effects of alcohol present some alternative 
predictions for how behaviour could be influenced on our task. The ‘alcohol myopia’ 
theory (Steele and Josephs 1990; Wagner et al. 2018) proposes that alcohol narrows the 
focus of attention and reduces information processing capacity. In the specific context of a 
binary choice task, such alcohol myopia may be expected to lead to a degraded 
representation of the reinforcement history. For example, a sober participant may consider 
the prior four or five events in shaping their next prediction, whereas an intoxicated 
individual may only consider the last one or two events (c.f. Euser et al. 2011). In this 
example, because the sober participant is using irrelevant information, the effect of alcohol 
may be to reduce this distortion, and this would be manifested as an attenuation of 
sequential biases at longer run or streak lengths. Based on a third possibility, alcohol may 
modulate the gambler’s sensitivity to reinforcing and/or punishing consequences (e.g. 
Vogel-Sprott 1967; Glautier et al. 1998); for example, via downstream pharmacological 
actions on dopamine neurotransmission (Boileau et al. 2003; Connor et al. 2016). On a risk-
taking task, intoxicated participants were hyper-sensitive to gain outcomes and hypo-
sensitive to losses (Lane et al. 2006). On the roulette task used in the present experiment, 
such alterations may be expressed as dissociations between the effects on winning vs losing 
feedback, in the context of minimal impact on colour choices and the gambler’s fallacy. 
The present study considered the three mechanisms outlined above for how alcohol 
might influence sequential biases on our roulette task. Based on the cognitive model of 
gambling, hypothesis 1 was that alcohol would enhance gambling distortions, as shown by 
increases in the gambler’s fallacy and the effects of feedback streaks. Hypothesis 2, 
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informed by the alcohol myopia account (Steele and Josephs 1990), was that alcohol would 
interfere with the mental representation of longer sequences, resulting in less strategic 
choice overall, and a greater influence of the recent events compared to longer sequences of 
events. Hypothesis 3 was that alcohol would primarily affect the sensitivity to reward 
and/or punishment on the task, creating an asymmetrical effect as a function of feedback, 




Male student participants (n = 46, mean age: 22.7 years, age range: 19 - 30 years) were 
recruited via university advertisements. For inclusion, participants were required to be 1) 
aged over 18, the legal age for both alcohol use and gambling in the jurisdiction, ii) social 
drinkers, defined by consuming at least one alcoholic drink per week (i.e. one unit, defined 
as the standard British unit of 8 grams alcohol) (mean units per week = 18.7, range = 3 - 
41.6 units), and iii) recreational gamblers, defined as having gambled at least once in the 
past year. Participants were excluded if they reported previous or current neurological 
illnesses or head injury, if they were taking medications that interacted with alcohol, or if 
they reported past or present alcohol misuse, gambling problems, or other mental health 
problems. Our design excluded females due to anticipated difficulty of recruiting female 
students with gambling and alcohol experience, in the context of a between-subjects design.   
The Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI) (Ferris and Wynne 2001) indicated 
that the sample comprised 16 non-problem gamblers (score = 0), 19 ‘low-risk’ gamblers 
(score = 1-2), and 11 ‘moderate-risk’ gamblers (score = 3-7). Self-reported games of choice 
were mostly blackjack, poker, and sports betting. The majority of participants reported not 
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smoking (n = 32) or occasional smoking (n = 12), with only two participants smoking on a 
daily basis. Participants received £32 pounds for participation, with an additional task-
related bonus of £1.98 - £4.77 (mean = £2.91). The study was approved by the University 
of Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Procedure  
The study employed a double-blind placebo-controlled design based on the alcohol 
challenge procedure in Loeber & Duka (2009a) and George et al. (2005).  Participants were 
telephone screened for eligibility and instructed to not consume any illicit drugs for 48 
hours prior to arrival, or alcohol for 24 hours before testing. Participants were asked to 
consume a light meal before arrival. Following consent at the laboratory, the participant 
was breathalysed using a Lion 500 breathalyser (CMI Inc, Kentucky, USA) to ensure 
sobriety (no participants were excluded), and weighed to calibrate the alcohol dose. 
Participants were randomly allocated to the placebo (n = 22) or alcohol (n = 24) condition. 
Participants in the alcohol group were administered a 0.8g/kg body-weight-adjusted dose of 
alcohol, which was chosen as the most effective dose on risk taking in the multiple-dosing 
study by Lane and colleagues (2004). The alcoholic beverage was vodka, diluted with 500 
ml of tonic water and flavoured with angostura bitters (Loeber and Duka 2009a). 
Participants in the placebo group received tonic water and bitters. All participants were 
informed that they would receive either a low or high dose of alcohol (Hull and Bond 
1986). We hoped that this approach would create an alcohol expectancy in both conditions; 
we note that more complex experimental designs are needed to evaluate the psychological 
effects of expectancy, which could also influence gambling behaviour (Breslin et al. 1999; 
Sagoe et al. 2017). To maintain blinding, a research nurse prepared all beverages, and the 
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breathalyser display was masked, with the result stored in the device’s memory for coding 
after the session.  
Participants completed the Alcohol Use Questionnaire (AUQ) (Mehrabian and 
Russell 1978), the UPPS-P Impulsive Behaviour Scale (UPPS-P) (Cyders et al. 2007), the 
Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (Raylu and Oei 2004), and the PGSI (Ferris and 
Wynne 2001), while the beverages were being prepared. Alcohol units on the AUQ 
distinguished by beverage type (glass of wine = 1.5 units, pint of beer = 2.4 units, spirits 
measure = 1 unit, alcopops = 1.7 units) (Nikolaou et al. 2013). 
For the consumption period, the participant drank a 50 ml cup of beverage every 
three minutes. Depending on the exact body weight adjustment, participants drank around 
10 cups in total over a 30 minute period. Cognitive testing commenced 20 minutes later. 
Participants played a slot machine simulation (not reported here) and a roulette task, with 
the task order counterbalanced by group. Blood alcohol concentrations (BAC) and ratings 
of the stimulant and sedative effects of alcohol were taken immediately before and after the 
cognitive tasks. During the drinking and waiting period, participants watched a television 
show (Modern Family). Upon completing the experiment, participants were asked whether 
they believed they had received alcohol, and if so, how many standard drinks they believed 
they had consumed. Participants who had consumed alcohol were required to wait until 
their BAC level was below 0.05% before they were able to leave the laboratory.  
 
Roulette task  
The roulette task ran in Visual Basic 6 (Microsoft Corporation, USA) presented on a 15 
inch laptop, and was based upon an original task by Ayton & Fischer (2004) that was 
validated behaviourally in our lab in Studer et al (2015). The participant was endowed £3 to 
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play the game, with any remaining funds at completion honoured as a bonus. The display 
presented a roulette wheel with 18 red and black alternating segments (see Figure 1). On 
each trial, the colour prediction and bet size choice were combined, using a single response 
made on a horizontal bar shaded from red to black, with bet amounts (1 pence to 10 pence) 
indicated by the distance of the click from the central position. After 2 seconds, a ‘Quickly’ 
warning message was shown to maintain a fast pace of play.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
After the participant’s response, the colour prediction and bet amount were 
displayed to the side of the screen, and the roulette wheel spun for 0.5 - 2 s. The ‘spin’ 
involved imposing a yellow border on successive segments, before stopping on a red or 
black segment. If the colour prediction was correct, a feedback message (“Correct, You 
Win”) was displayed, accompanied by a black tick and a cash machine sound. For incorrect 
predictions, the message “Incorrect! You lose” was accompanied by a cross and an 
unpleasant loss sound. Feedback was presented for 2 s followed by an inter-trial interval of 
2 s. To minimise working memory demands, two bars at the top of the screen displayed the 
last five colour outcomes and accuracy (tick, cross) the last five correct predictions.  
The participant completed 110 trials, taking approximately 15 minutes. A random 
sequence was created for each participant to avoid any systematic effect from using a fixed 
sequence. Instructions emphasised that the outcomes were random, similar to a casino 
roulette wheel. Our biases of interest may only be elicited after longer runs (streaks) of 
three or more events (Carlson and Shu 2007), so to ensure an adequate number of longer 
runs and streaks, two conditional loops were coded into the sequence algorithm: i) if an 
outcome run of four trials had not occurred in the last 20 trials, a run of four was inserted, 
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ii) if a streak of four wins or losses had not occurred in the last 20 trials, then a streak of 
four was inserted. This algorithm also curtailed any runs or streaks longer than six events. 
On completion of the task, each participant was presented with their totals of correct and 
incorrect predictions and their bonus.  
 
Statistical analysis  
Questionnaire data were analysed using SPSS Statistics (Version 22, IBM Corp, Armonk, 
NY). Logistic regressions were run using R (R Core Team, Vienna, Austria) on the trial-by-
trial data from the Roulette task, allowing simultaneous modelling of multiple variables. 
Due to the unbalanced nature of the data whereby the participant’s choices influenced the 
numbers of each event experienced, we used a fixed effects approach in which each 
participant acts as their own control so that resulting parameter estimates are unbiased 
(Allison 2005). We ran frequentist regression models using iteratively reweighted least 
squares (R core package, glm). We repeated the models using Bayesian inference (rstanarm 
package, using 4000 iterations, 4 chains and the default (weakly informative) priors). Our R 
code is available at https://github.com/CGR-UBC/2019_GF_alcohol .  
Model 1 investigated predictors of colour choice, with choice coded as chose same 
as last outcome (1) or chose different from last outcome (0). Model 2 investigated 
predictors of bet size. For betting behaviour, inspection of the data indicated that many 
participants appear to ‘anchor’ their bets around different points on the bet scale, and thus 
bet amount was dichotomised around each participant’s median bet (high bets 1, low bets 
0) to capture within-participant bet variability.  
In preparing the data for analysis, participants who displayed minimal variation in 
either colour choice (chose same colour for >97% of trials) or bet amount (chose 1 pence or 
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10 pence bets with SD < .001) were omitted, resulting in removal of eight participants. The 
final dataset comprised 22 alcohol versus 16 placebo participants. The first trial was 
discarded for each participant, as this trial had no preceding context, and trials representing 
runs or streaks of 6 events were discarded as rare events that always signified the 
termination of that sequence. These exclusions led to removal of 137 (3.3%) trials from 
4,142 trials total.  
 
Model 1: Colour choice. Previous studies have found that run length and win/loss feedback 
interact in predicting choice behaviour on roulette-type tasks: the gambler’s fallacy is 
enhanced when players are losing (Boynton 2003; Studer et al. 2015). For predictors in 
Model 1, we considered colour Run Length (the number of consecutive red/black outcomes 
preceding the current trial, 1 – 5), Previous Feedback (0 = loss, 1 = win), and Group (0 = 
placebo, 1 = alcohol), as well as Streak Length (1 – 5), and the associated higher-order 
interactions. Streak Length and Run Length predictors were recoded 0 - 4 so that our model 
baseline was meaningful. For our continuous predictors, we tested for violations of the 
assumption of a linear relationship between these predictors and the logit of the outcome 
variable by including an interaction term between each predictor and its log (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 1989) in a baseline model. The Run Length interaction was not significant (p = 
.11) and so Run Length was specified as a linear predictor. Streak Length was significant (p 
- .27), suggesting the linearity assumption was violated, and was therefore coded 
categorically, separating shorter streaks (0 = length 1 - 2) from longer streaks (1 = length 
3+). In addition, we ran supplementary models where both linear variables were entered as 
categorical (binary) predictors (see Supplemental Table S1). 
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We entered both Subject and a Subject by Previous Feedback term as fixed effects, 
resulting in two beta estimates per participant. This controls for individual differences in 
the tendency to choose same as last outcome (the Subject term) and the tendency to choose 
the same as last choice (the Subject x Previous Feedback term), which thus accounted for 
biases in the distribution of trial types within each subject that arose systematically from the 
participants’ choices. Due to the arbitrary nature of these beta values, these coefficients are 
not reported. An important consequence of entering these predictors as fixed effects is that 
our model cannot estimate predictors for Group or Previous Feedback. To carry out these 
group comparisons, we extracted the Subject and Subject x Previous Feedback beta values 
from the model, and tested for groups differences using t-tests. 
After observing the significant 3-way interaction of Streak Length x Previous 
Feedback x Group in Model 1, we report three subset logistic regression models to assess 
the differential effects of alcohol on winning and losing streaks. These subset models were 
restricted to: i) win trials in the placebo group, ii) win trials in the alcohol group, and iii) 
loss trials in the alcohol group.   
 
Model 2: Betting. The betting analysis used a more exploratory approach in which all 
possible predictors and their interaction terms were entered initially into the model, and 
non-significant predictors were removed consecutively, starting with the highest order 
interaction terms. Non-significant lower order predictors were retained if an interaction 
containing this predictor was significant (Field et al. 2012). Predictors were: Subject, 
Colour Run Length, Feedback Streak Length, Previous Feedback, and Group (each coded 
as in Model 1). Additionally, we entered Colour Choice on the current trial (0 = different 
from previous outcome, 1 = same as previous outcome). As for model 1, we tested the 
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assumption of linearity for our continuous variables. As Streak Length and Run Length did 
not violate linearity in model 2 (p = .89 and .50 respectively), both were entered as linear 
predictors. In addition, we ran supplementary models where both linear variables were 
entered as categorical predictors (see Supplemental Table S2). The Subject x Previous 
Feedback term in Model 1 was not used in Model 2, because bet size did not influence the 
trial types experienced within each subject; consequently, Previous Feedback is available as 
a predictor in Table 3.  
 
For both models, model fit of the least squares regression was assessed using 
pseudo R2 (Cox-Snell) and improvements to the model were quantified by comparing the 
residual deviance with the significant predictors included in the model to the residual 
deviance with only the Subject (and Subject x Previous Feedback) predictor included, using 
a chi-square test. The c-statistic was used to assess predictive accuracy. Leverage and 
standardised residuals were calculated case-wise to identify cases with undue influence on 
the model, or where the model fit was poor. For the Bayesian models, all the chains 
converged (assessed with Rhat), and the effective sample size was not excessively reduced 
by autocorrelation. For all models, these assumptions were met: models were reliable and 
not unduly influenced by any cases. For plotting, predicted probabilities from the 
frequentist models were calculated for each trial type for each participant, even if the 
participant did not experience the trial type (e.g. Run Length = 5). Means and standard 
errors were calculated from the raw data only, and therefore included only those 
participants that experienced the trial types. Unlike the model predictions, the raw data 
includes biases resulting from participant behaviour influencing the trial types experienced 
by each participant.  
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Our hypotheses can then be expressed as follows. As an overall exaggeration of 
sequential biases, hypothesis 1 should be manifested in model 1 in the Run Length x Group 
term (i.e. the gambler’s fallacy), and in Model 2 in the Streak Length x Feedback x Group 
term (i.e. increased betting on longer losing streaks), with steeper slopes in the alcohol 
condition. Hypothesis 2, an increased reliance on more recent information under alcohol, 
would be manifested in shallower slopes in these same interaction terms, as well as an 
increased effect of the previous feedback (i.e. the Feedback x Group term in model 2). 
Hypothesis 3 generates the clearest prediction in model 2, as a specific form of the Streak 
Length x Feedback x Group interaction in which the winning streak slope (reward 
sensitivity) is steeper and the losing streak slope (punishment sensitivity) is reduced. 
Hypothesis 3 generates no clear predictions for Colour Run Length. 
Results 
Participant information 
Alcohol and placebo groups did not differ significantly in terms of age, weight, units of 
alcohol consumed per week, or PGSI scores (see Table 1). The groups did not differ on trait 
levels of gambling cognitions (GRCS) or impulsivity (UPPS-P).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Alcohol manipulation check  
The mean BAC rating for the alcohol group was 0.40mg/l (SD = 0.09), equivalent to a 
blood alcohol level of 0.09%. In the alcohol group, all participants endorsed having 
consumed alcohol (mean unit estimate = 5.45, SD = 1.47). Fifteen of 16 participants in the 
placebo group endorsed having consumed alcohol (mean unit estimate = 2.72, SD = 1.69), 




Model 1: Colour Choice  
The Run Length predictor was significant (see Table 2 for all Model 1 predictors), such that 
the predicted probability of choosing same as last outcome decreased as Run Length 
increased (while fixing the other predictors at zero). This effect was consistent across both 
frequentist and Bayesian models (see Table 2) and with linear and categorical predictors 
(see Table S1); for all subsequent effects in model 1 and 2, we will only note the instances 
where these model checks were not consistent with the main model. The downward slope 
in Figure 2a shows that as Run Length increases, the probability of making a gambler’s 
fallacy decision increases. There were no significant higher-order interactions with Run 
Length, which suggests that the Run Length effect was consistent across feedback type. 
However, in the Bayesian model, the Run Length predictor was not robust in either group 
after a win (note 95% uncertainty intervals in Table 2). In Figure 2, it can also be seen that 
in the placebo group, participants tended to choose same as last outcome following wins, 
and choose different from last outcome (i.e. gambler’s fallacy) following losses. Alcohol 
reduced this difference, and primarily so following wins, but this difference in the effect of 
Previous Feedback did not differ significantly by group in the t-test based on the individual 
Subject x Previous Feedback beta values from the frequentist model (see Model 1 Methods) 
(t(35.44) = 1.52 , p = .14). 
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here] 
Colour choice was predicted by Streak Length (see Figure 3a and 3b). There was a 
significant 3-way interaction of Group x Streak Length x Previous Feedback, which was 
decomposed using subset models. For winning streaks, as Streak Length increased, both 
groups showed a decrease in the probability of choosing same as last outcome (i.e. 
increased gambler’s fallacy, see Alcohol Win and Placebo Win subset models). There was 
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some evidence that the groups differed in the effect of losing streaks. In the placebo group, 
as losing Streak Length increased, the probability of choosing same as last outcome 
increased (i.e. decreased gambler’s fallacy, see Streak Length effect in main model 1); 
although this was not supported in the Bayesian analysis. In the alcohol group, losing 
Streak Length did not predict colour choice (see Alcohol Loss model).  
 [Insert Figure 3 here] 
Model 2: Bet size 
In the placebo group, betting behaviour did not differ following gains or losses (the 
Previous Feedback predictor), when the other predictors were fixed at zero, i.e. on short 
runs and streaks. The significant Group x Previous Feedback effect (see Table S2) shows 
that in the alcohol group, bet size was higher following losses compared to gains (see 
Figure 4). This effect was robust across the Bayesian and categorical model checks. There 
were several further predictors of bet size that did not significantly differ between the 
groups (Table 3). The probability of placing a high bet increased with Run Length, and this 
effect was consistent across all conditions. The probability of betting high also increased 
with Streak Length. This Streak Length effect was significantly stronger on losing streaks 
compared to winning streaks (Streak length x Previous Feedback term, see Figure 5a), but 
this result was not significant when Streak Length was entered as a categorical predictor 
(see Supplementary Table S2), suggesting a linear predictor may not have been a good fit 
for the data.  
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 4 here] 
The Colour Choice predictor (same or different from last outcome) did not 
significantly predict bet size, but there was a significant and robust Colour Choice x 
Previous Feedback interaction. This reflected participants placing higher bets on a 
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gambler’s fallacy decision following a loss (compared to a gain), compared to no difference 
in betting after gains and losses on trials where they chose the same as last outcome (see 
Figure 5b). Additionally, a Colour Choice x Streak Length interaction reflected high bets 
on longer streaks when making a gambler’s fallacy decision. These higher-order 
interactions for streak length and colour choice did not differ by alcohol group.  




The current study assessed the effects of alcohol consumption on sequential decision-
making biases using a simulated roulette task that involved choosing and betting on 
red/black outcomes. The behavioural patterns on the task were consistent with a number of 
established sequential biases in human decision-making. On model 1, colour choices in 
both groups were in line with the classic gambler’s fallacy effect, such that participants 
were less likely to choose either colour following a longer run of that colour (see Figure 2). 
Colour choice was also consistent with reinforcement learning, such that participants 
tended to stick with their previous choices (chose same as last outcome) after winning 
predictions, but were more likely to switch their colour choice (chose different from last 
outcome) after losing predictions, as described previously (Boynton 2003; Studer et al. 
2015). For model 2, the amount bet tended to increase with streak length, and especially so 
on losing streaks (Streak Length x Previous Feedback) (see Figure 5b). This is a likely 
expression of loss chasing that has also been reported previously (Ball 2012; Studer et al. 
2015). Lastly, a Colour Choice x Previous Feedback interaction in model 2 indicated that 
on gambler’s fallacy decisions, participants bet more after losses than gains, thus taking on 
more risk (see Figure 5a) (see also Studer et al. 2015). We employed a sensitive fixed 
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effects regression approach to make best use of trial-by-trial data, and we ran 
supplementary model checks using Bayesian statistics, and coding the run length and streak 
length predictors categorically rather than linearly, to establish robustness of our findings.  
 Our hypotheses for the effects of alcohol were based on three distinct frameworks. 
With regard to hypothesis 1 (enhanced cognitive distortions), we did not find evidence for 
any simple effect of alcohol on the slopes of the gambler’s fallacy effect (model 1) or the 
losing streak effect on betting (model 2). For hypothesis 2 (alcohol myopia and the mental 
representation of longer runs and streaks), participants in both groups displayed effects on 
both colour choice and betting behaviour at longer run and/or streak lengths, indicating that 
under the influence of alcohol, participants were fundamentally capable of maintaining 
longer event histories. For hypothesis 3 (reward and punishment sensitivity), our observed 
effect of alcohol on betting was driven by a response to losses as opposed to gains, 
contrasting with a narrow ‘dopaminergic’ formulation that alcohol might enhance reward 
(i.e. gain) signalling (Boileau et al. 2003; Connor et al. 2016). As such, our observed 
pattern of results does not provide evidence that maps readily on to any of the three initial 
hypotheses.   
Nonetheless, we did find evidence for an interesting effect of alcohol in model 2, 
where the alcohol group placed higher bets after a loss compared to a win, whereas the 
placebo group did not show an effect of the previous feedback on bet size (see Figure 4). 
This effect was robust across model checks. We interpret this effect as loss chasing under 
the influence of alcohol. This observation corroborates the earlier study by Kyngdon and 
Dickerson (1999), which tested participants on a learning task that involved play or quit 
decisions over a series of trials with a steadily diminishing rate of return. Their main 
finding was that participants under alcohol intoxication persisted for more trials, but in 
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addition, participants in the alcohol group placed higher bets immediately after a loss 
compared to a win, whereas there was no difference in the placebo group. The average bets 
were somewhat larger in Kyngdon and Dickerson (1999) (alcohol AUS $2.43, placebo 
AUS $3.13) compared to the present study, suggesting that alcohol’s effects on loss chasing 
may hold at larger stakes. As loss chasing is a cardinal feature of disordered gambling, an 
effect of alcohol to promote loss chasing could be conceptualized within a broader 
framework of alcohol promoting gambling-related cognitive distortions, albeit not in the 
specific form of the sequential biases that were tested by our roulette procedure (O’Connor 
and Dickerson 2003; Ellery and Stewart 2014).  
Our findings also resonate with prior studies looking at the effects of alcohol 
challenge on other learning and choice environments. On an operant conditioning task in 
which responses to different stimuli either won (S+) or lost (S-) money, participants in the 
alcohol group made more responses to the S-, despite manipulation checks indicating intact 
knowledge of the basic task contingencies (Loeber and Duka 2009b). Using a more 
complex decision-making task that separated the sensitivity to probability, win magnitude 
and loss magnitude, participants under alcohol remained sensitive to all three parameters 
but were less able to integrate win and probability information on trial types where the 
potential losses were large (George et al. 2005). The common theme across these studies is 
the impaired ability under alcohol to weight and respond under negative contexts. Yet, it 
should also be recognized that the effects of alcohol on gambling behaviour may not be 
inherently adverse: drawing on alcohol myopia theory, Wagner et al (2018) found support 
for their hypothesis that if a low probability of winning was made highly salient on a 
simulated slot machine game, alcohol loading actually reduced gambling tendencies, over 
four separate experiments.       
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Our alcohol manipulation was effective in inducing an alcohol expectancy in both 
the placebo and alcohol conditions. We infer that the observed differences by condition 
reflect the pharmacological actions of alcohol rather than cognitive expectancies (Marlatt et 
al. 1973; Sagoe et al. 2017). Nevertheless it remains possible that the generation of an 
alcohol expectancy in the placebo condition could have obscured some of the 
pharmacological effects. Characterizing the effects of alcohol expectancies requires a more 
complex experimental design. For example, Sagoe et al (2017) employed a 2 x 2 ‘balanced 
placebo’ design in which alcohol and placebo conditions were crossed with an instruction 
of receiving either alcohol or placebo. In that study, no significant effects were observed of 
either alcohol or alcohol expectancy on behavioural measures from a slot machine 
simulation, despite subjective effects of alcohol on intoxication and desire to gamble. 
Certain limitations should be considered when interpreting the results. First, we 
tested only male participants, who tend to show higher levels of risk-taking (Cross et al. 
2011) and higher rates of problem gambling (Kessler et al. 2008), but generalization to 
females cannot be assumed. Rates of problem gambling appear to be increasing among 
females (McCarthy et al. 2019), and gambling tendencies (including the use of alcohol 
while gambling) were recently linked to menstrual cycle phase (Joyce et al. 2019). 
Moreover, our sample size was small so that our experiment was only powered to detect 
large effects. Second, our roulette task was designed to quantify the sequential biases that 
were our main focus, but this choice of task created a disparity between roulette as a 
chance-based game and the real-world gambling experience of our sample, which primarily 
pertained to more strategic forms (card games, sports betting). In addition, our task 
displayed recent history information (last five colours and win/loss outcomes) (see Figure 
1); we elected to present these history bars to reduce working memory demands, but it is 
25 
 
not known to what extent these cues may alter (and potentially increase) sequential biases, 
and it is possible that the salience of this information may have compromised our ability to 
test hypothesis 2 regarding the mental representation of the recent history. While most 
effects on the roulette task in our main models were corroborated by our model checks, 
some effects were not supported (e.g. streak effects in model 1, and the streak length x 
feedback term in model 2) and could reflect Type 1 errors. Third, our recruitment targeted a 
student sample of social drinkers with modest levels of gambling involvement, and the 
effects of alcohol may differ quantitatively, or qualitatively, in people with gambling 
problems and/or alcohol use disorders (Ellery et al. 2005; Abdollahnejad et al. 2014).  
Despite these limitations, these results may be relevant to gambling policy. If our 
observation of loss chasing under the influence of alcohol is supported by future research 
(and see also Kyngdon and Dickerson 1999), this effect would strengthen the need for 
careful regulation of alcohol in gambling venues, and public awareness messaging around 
alcohol consumption during gambling in the home, especially in relation to online 
gambling. In light of the challenges with the detection of disordered gambling in gambling 
venues (Delfabbro et al. 2012), alcohol use could be specified within multivariate 
algorithms for risk detection. Training programs for casino floor staff should recognize the 
impairing effects of alcohol. This study also bridges a gap in theory between research on 
the risk-promoting effects of alcohol and the judgment and decision-making biases that 
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Table 1 Participant information for the placebo and alcohol conditions, Mean (SD) 
    Placebo Alcohol  t(36) 
Age    22.3 (2.39) 22.1 (2.62)  0.27 
Weight (kg)   79.5 (6.86) 81.9 (14.0)  0.63 
Bonus Payment (£)  2.96 (0.30) 2.86 (0.60)  0.64  
AUQ units per week  17.0 (8.63) 20.6 (8.95)  1.28 
PGSI    1.94 (2.29) 1.55 (1.71)  0.60 
GRCS   
   Gambling expectancies 11.7 (3.48) 11.8 (4.36)  0.07 
   Illusion of control  6.31 (3.93) 5.68 (3.06)  0.56 
   Predictive control  13.1 (5.30) 14.8 (6.59)  0.85 
   Inability to stop  6.88 (3.86) 6.64 (2.26)  0.24 
   Interpretive bias  12.1 (5.45) 15.0 (6.10)  1.56 
UPPS Impulsivity  
  Negative Urgency  29.7 (5.55) 26.6 (6.62)  1.52 
  Premeditation  22.5 (4.58) 21.8 (4.43)  0.46 
  Perseverance  19.3 (3.84) 19.9 (4.48)  0.40 
  Sensation Seeking   38.9 (4.25) 38.5 (5.14)  0.28 
  Positive Urgency  26.9 (7.40) 25.5 (8.31)  0.51 
AUQ = Alcohol Use Questionnaire; PGSI = Problem Gambling Severity Index; GRCS = 





Table 2. Colour choice model (Model 1). 
 β (SE) Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
p value Bayesian point 
estimates (95% 
uncertainty interval) 
Run Length -0.35 (0.08) 0.70 (0.59 - 0.83) < .001 -0.40 (-0.57, -0.23) 
Run Length * Feedback  0.17 (0.12) 1.19 (0.94 – 1.50) .15 0.25 (0.014, 0.48) 
Group * Run Length 0.11 (0.11) 1.12 (0.90 – 1.40) .32 0.10 (-0.1, 0.33) 
Group * Run Length * Feedback -0.10 (0.16) 0.91 (0.66 – 1.25) .55 -0.10 (-0.42, 0.21) 
Streak Length 0.39 (0.19) 1.48 (1.01 – 2.15) .043 0.33 (-0.044, 0.71) 
Streak Length *  Feedback -1.05 (0.27) 0.35 (0.21 – 0.59) < .001 -0.94 (-1.47, -0.42) 
Group * Streak Length -0.72 (0.28) 0.49 (0.28 – 0.84) .011 -0.68 (-1.23, -0.14) 
Group * Streak Length * Feedback 0.94 (0.37) 2.56 (1.24 – 5.31) .011 0.88 (0.19, 1.59) 
Subset models     
Placebo win     
Run length -0.18 (0.08) 0.83 (0.71 – 0.98) .029 -0.16 (-0.32, 0.0095) 
Streak length -0.66 (0.19) 0.52 (0.36 – 0.75) < .001 -0.64 (-1.0032, -0.26) 
Alcohol loss     
Run length -0.24 (0.08) 0.79 (0.67 – 0.91) .0017 -0.27 (-0.43, -0.12) 
Streak length -0.33 (0.21) 0.72 (0.48 – 1.07) .11 -0.35 (-0.76, 0.052) 
Alcohol win     
Run length -0.17 (0.08) 0.85 (0.73 – 0.98) .029 -0.16 (-0.31, -0.011) 
Streak length -0.44 (0.15) 0.65 (0.48 – 0.87) .020 -0.44 (-0.73, -0.14) 
 
Beta estimates (β) and odds ratio from the least squares logistic regression, and point 
estimates and uncertainty intervals from the Bayesian logistic regression. For the main 
model, the baseline was Placebo group, after a loss. The subset models assessed the effect 
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of Run Length and Streak Length within the other conditions. Feedback is Previous 
Feedback (0 = loss, 1 = win). For Group, 0 = placebo, 1 = alcohol. Streak Length was 
entered categorically (0 = length 1 - 2; 1 = length 3+). Model χ 2(8) = 76.7, p < .001. R2 = 





Table 3 Bet size model (Model 2).  
 β (SE) Odds ratio (95% 
CI) 
p value Bayesian point estimates 
(95% uncertainty interval) 
Colour Choice 0.014 (0.13) 1.01 (0.78 – 1.32) .92 0.035 (-0.23, 0.29) 
Run Length 0.079 (0.04) 1.08 (1.01 - 1.16) .025 0.084 (0.015, 0.15) 
Feedback -0.21 (0.15) 0.81 (0.60 - 1.09) .171 -0.20 (-0.50, 0.096) 
Streak Length 0.28 (0.05) 1.32 (1.19 - 1.47) < .001 0.28 (0.18, 0.39) 
Colour Choice * Streak 
Length 
-0.35 (0.07) 0.70 (0.62 - 0.80) < .001 -0.36 (-0.49, -0.23) 
Colour Choice * Feedback   0.72 (0.16) 2.05 (1.49 - 2.83) < .001 0.71 (0.39, 1.03) 
Streak Length * Feedback -0.17 (0.07) 0.84 (0.74 - 0.96) .0087 -0.18 (-0.31, -0.049) 




Beta estimates (β) and odds ratio from the least squares logistic regression, and point 
estimates and uncertainty intervals from the Bayesian logistic regression. The baseline in 
the model was the placebo group, after a loss, making a gambler’s fallacy choice. Feedback 
is Previous Feedback (0 = loss, 1 = win). For Group, 0 = placebo, 1 = alcohol. 
Model χ 2(8) = 117, p < .001. R2 = 0.13 (Cox and Snell), AUC [95% CI] for model 2: 0.72 











Figure 2. In the colour choice model, the classic ‘gambler’s fallacy’ run length effect is 
illustrated, separated by Group (placebo = grey, alcohol = black) and Previous Feedback 
(loss = dashed line, win = solid line). Note this effect is fixed for shorter Streak lengths (1-
2). The y axis displays the probability of choosing the same colour as the colour outcome 
on the preceding trial. The model predictions are shown as lines, and the descriptives 





Figure 3. Significant interactions of Streak length (short, long) and Previous Feedback 
(loss = black, win = grey) in the colour choice model, for the placebo (white) and alcohol 
(grey stippled) conditions. These effects are shown separately for wins (a) and for losses 
(b). Effects are fixed at run length = 1.The y axis displays the probability of choosing the 
same colour as the colour outcome on the preceding trial. The model predictions shown as 





Figure 4. The effect of alcohol (group: alcohol, placebo) and previous feedback (loss =  
grey bars/diamonds, gain = white bars/circles) on bet size in the roulette task. The y-axis 
represents the predicted probability of placing a high bet. Effects are fixed at run length = 
1, streak length = 1, colour choice = 0 (i.e. different from last choice). The model 






Figure 5. Behavioural interactions for the bet size model. In all panels, the y-axis 
represents the predicted probability of placing a high bet. Raw data means (± SE) shown as 
markers, model predictions shown as lines or bars. a) Colour choice (different or same) x 
Previous feedback (loss = grey bars/diamonds, win = white bars/diamonds), fixed at run 
length = 1, streak length = 1, group = 0. b) Streak length (1 - 5) x Previous feedback (loss = 
grey line/diamonds, win = black line/circles, fixed at run length = 1, colour choice = 0, 







The effects of alcohol on sequential decision-making biases during gambling, by Tobias-
Webb, Limbrick-Oldfield, Vearncombe, Duka & Clark 
 
 β (SE)  p value  Bayesian point 
estimates (95% 
uncertainty interval) 
Run Length -1.03 (0.23) < .001 -1.10 (-1.55, -0.66) 
Run Length * Feedback  0.61 (0.31) .051 0.72 (0.12,  1.31) 
Group * Run Length 0.37 (0.30) .219 0.34 (-0.23,  0.94) 
Group * Run Length * Feedback -0.19 (0.41) .641 -0.18 (-0.97,  0.59) 
Streak Length 0.45 (0.20) .023 0.37 (-0.0074, 0.75) 
Streak Length *  Feedback -1.10 (0.27)  4.97e-05 -0.97 (-1.49, -0.45) 
Group * Streak Length -0.76 (0.28)  .007 -0.73 (-1.28, -0.19) 
Group * Streak Length * 
Feedback 
0.97 (0.37)  .010 0.89 (0.20,   1.60) 
Subset models    
Placebo win    
Run length -0.42 (0.21) .043 -0.38 (-0.79, 0.021) 
Streak length -0.66 (0.19)  < .001 -0.63 (-1.01, -0.25) 
Alcohol loss    
Run length -0.66 (0.20) < .001 -0.71 (-1.10, -0.33) 
Streak length -0.32 (0.21) .130 -0.34 (-0.76, 0.059) 
Alcohol win    
Run length -0.25 (0.19) .180 -0.23 (-0.60, 0.14) 
Streak length -0.45 (0.15)  .002 -0.46 (-0.74, -0.17) 
 
Table S1: Colour choice model (Model 1). Beta estimates (β) from the least squares logistic 
regression, and point estimates and uncertainty intervals from the Bayesian logistic 
regression. For the main model, the baseline was Placebo group, after a loss. The subset 
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models assessed the effect of Run Length and Streak Length within the other conditions. 
Feedback is Previous Feedback (0 = loss, 1 = win). For Group, 0 = placebo, 1 = alcohol. 
Streak Length and Run Length were entered categorically (0 = length 1 - 2; 1 = length 3+). 
This model was carried out to check the results were consistent when we did not assume 
Run Length was linear. 
 
 
 β (SE)  p value Bayesian point estimates (95% 
uncertainty interval) 
Colour Choice -0.11 (0.13) .046 -0.085 (-0.34, 0.16) 
Run Length 0.24 (0.091) .009 0.25 (0.072, 0.43) 
Feedback -0.29 (0.15) .046 -0.28 (-0.57, 0.0064) 
Streak Length 0.59 (0.13) < .001 0.61 (0.34, 0.87) 
Colour Choice * Streak 
Length 
-0.78 (0.17) < .001 -0.78 (-1.11, -0.46) 
Colour Choice * 
Feedback   
0.72 (0.16) < .001 0.70 (0.39, 1.02) 
Streak Length * 
Feedback 
-0.31 (0.17) .061 -0.33 (-0.66, 0.0050) 
Group * Feedback -0.46 (0.15) .002 -0.46 (-0.75, -0.17) 
 
Table S2: Bet size model (Model 2). Beta estimates (β) from the least squares logistic 
regression, and point estimates and uncertainty intervals from the Bayesian logistic 
regression. The baseline in the model was the placebo group, after a loss, making a 
gambler’s fallacy choice. Feedback is Previous Feedback (0 = loss, 1 = win). For Group, 0 
= placebo, 1 = alcohol. Streak Length and Run Length were entered categorically (0 = 
length 1 - 2; 1 = length 3+). This model was carried out to check the results were consistent 
when we did not assume Run Length or Streak Length were linear. 
 
  
 
